Introduction
China has become an important player in the global market due to its stable financial presence in recent years, and Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) has increased steadily. China's OFDI flow to Africa has grown from 317,430 million dollars in 2004 to 2,516 billion dollars in 2012 (Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, 2013) . According to Ernest (2014) , between 2007 and 2013, the amount of FDI received from China accounted for 4.2% of Africa's total FDI. Compared with the amount of FDI contributed by other countries, China's contribution to Africa is not large (UAE -12.1%; UK -10.7%; US -8%; India -7.3%). Within China's OFDI, the African market receives far less than the Asian market (11.5% versus 53.6% in 2014), which suggests that China's FDI to Africa has an enormous potential for growth.
1 African countries currently face three major challenges: slow growth, poverty and inequality (Sundaram, Schwank, & von Armin, 2011) . Attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) is important for the African countries to meet these challenges, because not only could it help drive the economic growth directly, but it could also facilitate technology transfer from developed countries (Borensztein, De Gregorio, & Lee, 1998; Kahouli & Maktouf, 2015) .
Understanding the determinants of Chinese FDI into Africa thus becomes imperative for both theory and policy development.
Empirical studies on the determinants of Chinese OFDI so far show inconsistent or even contradictory results, particularly with regard to the host country factors such as natural resources and institutional quality. Seeking natural resources is seen as the main motive for Chinese OFDI in less developed countries (Cai, 1999) , but the empirical evidence is equivocal. Kolstad and Wiig (2012) and Ramasamy, Yeung, and Laforet (2012) show that natural resources were a significant factor for Chinese investment, whereas Blomkvist and Drogendijk (2013) , Cheung and Qian (2009) and Blomkvist and Drogendijk (2013) indicate the link was not significant. In Africa, accompanying cheaply available natural resources is often the poor institutional quality (Yang, Wang, Wang, & Yeh, 2017) . Good institutional environment and political stability obviously could attract FDI inflow (Dunning, 1982) , whilst Bevan and Estrin (2004) indicate that political stability is not an obvious determinant of FDI.
Empirical results so far show contradicting evidence regarding institutional factors' influence on Chinese OFDI. Several studies show that Chinese investors are particularly attracted to countries that have abundant natural resources with poor institution quality (eg. Buckley et al., 2007; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; Ramasamy et al., 2012 ).
This study therefore focuses on examining the effect of natural resources, market size and institutional factors on attracting Chinese FDI in Africa. The institutional quality includes five major factors: voice and accountability; political stability and absence of violence; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption (Howell, 2011) . These specific institutional factors may have different effect on attracting FDI (Bailey, 2017) , therefore we examine them separately rather than in aggregate. Market size is included in our analysis, because it is another key factors of Africa to attract FDI other than natural resources (Asiedu, 2006) , and
Chinese investment could be driven by the market (Chen, Dollar, & Tang, 2016 
Literature review and hypotheses

Natural resources and market size
When profit-maximising firms face global competition, FDI is one of the outcomes of their strategic decisions (De Mello, 1999) . Several factors may influence a firm's choice of location for investment. As indicated by Dunning (1998) , these factors into four main types: market-seeking, resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking and strategic asset-seeking. A country may attract more FDI if it has sufficient market size, abundant natural resources, low-cost labour or materials, or knowledge-related assets (Dunning, 1998) . Natural resources and market size are the two factors that have received most attention in the literature on the determinants of FDI in Africa (Asiedu, 2006; Rodriguez-Pose & Cols, 2017) .
Previous studies in general indicate that natural resources are positively related to FDI inflow (e.g. Deng, 2004; Hong & Sun, 2006; Naidu, 2007; Ramasamy et al., 2012; Renard, 2011; Sanfilippo, 2010; X. Zhang & Daly, 2011) . As for FDI in African countries, Asiedu (2006) shows that natural resources are a significant factor, based on an analysis of panel data over the period 1984 -2000 . Frynas and Paulo (2007 also highlight that natural resources play a key role for attracting FDI. Using data specific to Chinese outward investment in the period -2006 , Kolstad and Wiig (2012 show that the poorer a host country is, the greater the attraction of their natural resources to Chinese investors. However, several researchers do not find evidence to support that seeking natural resources is the main motive of Chinese FDI in Africa. For example, Cheung and Qian (2009) indicate that although both market size and resource endowment are significant drivers of Chinese outward investment in general, but resource-seeking is not the main motivator for Chinese investment in Africa. Similarly, J. Zhang, Wei, and Liu (2013) show that Chinese private enterprise investors are motivated by Africa's markets rather than its natural resources.
The rapid growth of China's economy in the past 30 years has triggered the country's demand for natural resources has increased dramatically. The Chinese government has encouraged OFDI as a tool to acquire sufficient supply natural resources to support the country's sustained development (Ye, 1992; Zhan, 1995 Consistent with the location theory proposed by Dunning (1998) , empirical studies overall confirm the positive relationship between market size and FDI inflows. Asiedu (2006) examines data of FDI in Africa and demonstrates that the market size play a key role. Kolstad and Wiig (2012) 
Voice and accountability
According to Howell (2011) , 'voice and accountability' encompasses military involvement in politics and democratic accountability. As noted by Howell (2011) , in the long term, a high level of military involvement in politics is likely to lead to an uneasy environment for foreign investors because it can generate corruption in the system of governance and can encourage an armed opposition. Busse and Hefeker (2007) found that there is a negative correlation between military involvement in politics and FDI after analysing a sample of 83 developing countries for the period 1984 to 2003. Cleeve (2012) reports that this is particularly the case in Sub-Saharan African countries.
Howell (2011) defines democratic accountability as how reactive a government is to its people, and explains that a less reactive government is more likely to fall, be it peacefully or violently. Kucera and Principi (2014) report mixed results showing that the effect of democracy varies across the industries. For the service and manufacturing industries, the effect is positive, whereas for the energy industry, it is negative. A few studies report a negative effect of democracy, such as Mathur and Singh (2013) . However, most empirical studies report a positive effect of democracy and FDI inflow. For example, Rodrik (1996) found that US companies tend to invest in countries with high democratic accountability. Q. Li and Resnick (2003) also found that an increase in democratic rights can lead to an increase in FDI, although their results may be biased by their limited sample size and restricted sample period (Busse & Hefeker, 2007) . Cleeve (2012) also supports this relationship, even if he believes that the result is not always robust. Jensen (2003 Jensen ( , 2008 shows that the relationship between fundamental democratic rights and FDI inflow is significant. Rodriguez-Pose and Cols (2017) refer to 'voice and accountability' as an indicator of good governance that helps to attract FDI in Africa. Thus:
H3: Voice and accountability of an African country is positively related to
China's FDI in that country.
Political stability and absence of violence
How political stability can affect the inflow of FDI is another contentious issue which has attracted much attention in previous research (Bevan & Estrin, 2004; Dunning, 1982) . Political stability measures how likely the governments of host countries are to be destabilised (Howell, 2011) . It can be affected by four main factors: government stability, internal conflict, external conflict and ethnic tensions (Howell, 2011) . A higher level of political instability can make the host country less attractive to investors because it is generally associated with higher levels of expropriation, which may worry potential investors (Azzimonti & Sarte, 2007) , and impede their commitment to investment (Büthe & Milner, 2008; Dunning, 1982; Schneider & Frey, 1985) .
Most scholars find that political instability is negatively related to the inflow of FDI (Cleeve, 2012; Naudé & Krugell, 2007; Qian & Baek, 2011; Ramasamy et al., 2012) , with one exception that Kolstad and Wiig (2012) find no significant relationship between political stability and FDI. In other words, the literature is generally agreed that political stability has a positive effect on FDI inflow. Thus:
H4: Political stability and the absence of violence in an African country are positively related to China's FDI in that country.
Regulatory quality
Regulatory quality measures the risks such as contract viability, profits repatriation, and payment delays (Cleeve, 2012; Gobinda Goswami & Haider, 2014 ).
The degree of regulatory quality determines how likely foreign investors are to receive their proper benefits. Previous studies overall indicate that regulatory quality attracts FDI inflow. For example, Busse and Hefeker (2007) show that investment profile, an important measurement of regulatory quality, is positively related to FDI inflows at the 10% level, meaning the relationship is statistically significant.
Chowdhury (2017) 
Rule of law
Rule of law indicates the quality of legal systems and contract enforcement (Bailey, 2017) . It is often seen as a key factor affecting welfare, stability and growth (Belton, 2005; Haggard, MacIntyre, & Tiede, 2008; Hiil, 2007) ; Janse, Sanchez Galera, and Liivoja (2007) Strong rule of law provides protection of property rights, reduces transaction costs for foreign firms (Khoury & Peng, 2011) . Moreover, strong rule of law decreases uncertainty and improves firm's efficiency and profitability (Bailey, 2017) . On the contrary, a lack of rule of law may lead to the liquidation of current investments, and this can deter potential investors (Hewko, 2002) . Previous studies indicate that rule of law in general has a positive effect on the inflow of FDI (Du, Lu, & Tao, 2008; Gani, 2007; Gastanaga, Nugent, & Pashamova, 1998; Khoury & Peng, 2011) . Studies that focus on African countries, such as those by Asiedu (2006) , Cleeve (2012) , Naudé and Krugell (2007) and Anyanwu (2012) , also confirm this positive relationship. Thus:
H6: Rule of law in an African country is positively related to the inflow of China's FDI in that country.
Control of corruption
Control of corruption refers to how well host countries can control their corruption dealing with corruption at home and tend to invest in those countries with similar levels of corruption (Blomkvist & Drogendijk, 2013; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002) .
Therefore, the following hypothesis requires a further test.
H7:
The level of corruption of an African country is negatively related to the inflow of China's FDI in that country. Investment.
Data and method
Explanatory variables
The main explanatory variables used in this study are: natural resources rent; market size; voice and accountability; political stability and absence of violence; regulatory quality; rule of law; control of corruption; infrastructure index/score; GDP; and trade.
Natural resources. Natural resources are measured using the index of the total natural resources rents (% of GDP) instead of the natural resources reserve in the 22
African countries. As the World Bank explains, to build an analytical framework for sustainable development, the index of natural resources rents -the measurement of the percentage of the contribution of natural resources to economic output -is vital. This index is used because investors tend to be more interested in the profitability of natural resources rather than that of those on the ground (Kolstad & Wiig, 2012) . The data of natural resources rents are taken from World Bank databases because 'the group is guided by professional standards in the collection, compilation and dissemination of data to ensure that all data users can have confidence in the quality and integrity of the data produced' (World Bank).
Market size. This study uses GDP as a proxy for market size (Asiedu, 2006; Chen et al., 2016; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012) , and the data extracted from the World Bank and the unit used is US dollar.
Voice and accountability. The index of voice and accountability summarises the effect of two factors: military involvement in politics and democratic accountability.
The data of voice and accountability for this study are extracted from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) by Political Risk Services (PRS). The ICRG, a methodology adopted by the PRS group, has been used by numerous researchers at various organisations, such as IMF (The PRS group).
Political stability and absence of violence. This index includes four elements:
government stability, internal conflict, external conflict, and ethnic tensions. The data are drawn from the ICRG by PRS.
Regulatory quality. The data of regulatory quality are extracted from the ICRG by PRS.
Rule of law. This is the measurement of the 'degree to which a country's citizens have confidence in the law and comply with the rules of society' and it focuses on the quality of the host country's legal system (Slangen & Van Tulder, 2009 ). The data of this index are drawn from the ICRG by PRS.
Control of corruption.
The data of this index are also extracted from the ICRG by PRS.
Control variables
Three control variables are included in our estimation, namely inflation, infrastructure and trade. The extant literature suggests that these variables are some of the major relevant factors in attracting FDI.
The first control variable is inflation. Investing in a foreign country with lower inflation rates can gain the investor a competitive advantage (Kleinert & Toubal, 2010) . We use the data of the GDP deflator (instead of the Consumer Price Index (CPI)) from the World Bank as a measurement of the inflation level of the 22 African countries being considered. According to Baumol and Blinder (2008) definition, the GDP deflator is 'a broad measure of economy-wide inflation that includes the prices of all goods and services in the economy.' Also, Baumol and Blinder (2008) explain that the GDP deflator can measure overall inflation more successfully than CPI because the former is based on a market basket including all goods and services produced by the economy.
The host country's infrastructure has a great role to play in attracting Chinese FDI, and is thus used as another control variable in this paper. The data of infrastructure index/score is from the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR). Considering all the hypotheses, the main estimate equation of this study (including GDP, inflation, trade, infrastructure, voice and accountability, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption) is as follows: One problem when analysing panel data is high correlation among independent variables, as this may cause multicollinearity. The correlation matrix shows whether the variables are correlated with one another. According to Table 3 , those independent variables used in this paper used are not too highly correlated (<0.8). Therefore, multicollinearity should not be a problem for the estimation results and those variables may be used for this paper's regressions.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Results and discussion
Hausman test. The Hausman Test ascertains whether the fixed-effect or the randomeffect model is more appropriate for the estimation. As Table 4 shows, the p value (Prob>chi2) of the Hausman Test is 0.0000, meaning the null hypotheses can be refused. In this instance, the Hausman test deems the fixed-effect model to be the more appropriate one.
[Insert Table 4 about here] Table 5 presents the main results from the regression of China's outward FDI stock with the fixed-effect model, using six explanatory variables and four control
variables. The Coef column shows the estimation coefficient for the equation. Also, the R-sq (0.77) shows that the fitted regression line is very close to the actual data.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Natural resources. The results as shown in Table 5 consistent with previous studies (Asiedu, 2006; Chen et al., 2016; Dunning, 1998; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012) .
Voice and accountability. The regression result shows a significant and positive relationship between the voice and accountability of the 22 host countries and China's OFDI stock, thus H3 was supported. The result is in line with the findings from most previous studies. For example, Busse and Hefeker (2007) , Rodrik (1996 ), Cleeve (2012 , Kucera and Principi (2014) , and Q. Li and Resnick (2003) agree that an increase in a country's voice and accountability may lead to an increased inflow of Chinese FDI.
Political stability and absence of violence. The result shows that political stability and absence of violence have a significant and negative relationship with China's OFDI in Africa. Thus, H4 was not supported. This suggests that countries with greater political instability are more attractive to Chinese investors. This finding is different from those of Büthe and Milner (2008), Dunning (1982) , Schneider and Frey (1985) , Azzimonti and Sarte (2007) , and Kolstad and Wiig (2012) . The coefficient is significant at the 10% level indicating that the negative correlation between political stability and China's FDI flow to Africa is relatively high. The reason for this negative effect is probably is a political one, in that those political unstable African countries and China may have bi-lateral political agreements that help reduce the risks of Chinese investment (Qian & Baek, 2011) .
Regulatory quality. The estimation results indicate that regulatory quality of the has a significant negative influence on inward FDI flow from China (significance at the 5% level). Thus, H5 was not supported. The results contradicts many previous empirical studies, such as those by Busse and Hefeker (2007) , Cleeve (2012), Naudé and Krugell (2007) and Gani (2007) who report a positive relationship between regulatory quality and FDI. However, this result is in line with the findings of
Anyanwu (2012) and J. Li (2014) Third, voice and accountability exerts a significant positive impact on the inflow of China's FDI to Africa. This is an encouraging sign, as it implies that African countries that strive to increase their voice and accountability, could attract more of China's FDI. We could expect that in the long term, as the institution quality in China gradually improves, Chinese investors still prefer to invest in a country with good institutional quality.
This study is limited to the data that Chinese investment in Africa is only a recent phenomenon, and the volume is relatively small compared to FDI from the developed countries. Nevertheless, the room for the growth of Chinese FDI in Africa is enormous. Further studies should examine the factors that are unique to the context such as bilateral political link between an African country and China.
